Consciousness and Cognition

Introduction Auto-Induced Cognitive Trance (AICT) is a non-ordinary state of consciousness (NOSC) that can be accessed by will alone once a standardised self-induction procedure has been learnt. The first research publication on AICT dates back only ten years, meaning that research on this phenomenon is still in its infancy. Previous reports concerning the phenomenology and neurophysiology of AICT revealed similarities with more extensively described NOSCs, as well as unusual features, raising questions about the potential benefits of AICT practice for well-being. Objective This study aimed to gather quantitative descriptive data on features associated with well-being in a large comparative sample of AICT practitioners and non-practitioners. Method This research followed a web-based survey study design which enquired AICT-trained and yet-to-be trained participants to self-report through validated standardised questionnaires on vitality, self-esteem, mental well-being, trait anxiety, life satisfaction, happiness, positive and negative affect, nature-relatedness and connectedness. Data on NOSCs practices, life history events that could have led to spontaneous NOSCs, and demographic data were collected for further inclusion as control variables in statistical models. Results The online questionnaire yielded 607 valid responses, (171 yet-to-be trained participants and 436 AICT-trained participants). AICT practice was found to be associated with increased self-esteem (RSE), overall connectedness (WCS) as well as all subdimensions of connectedness (WCS Self, WCS Others, WCS World). AICT practice Duration exhibited significant effects on global connectedness and all subdimensions of connectedness, self-esteem, trait anxiety (STAIT-5), and positive affect (PANAS+). Conclusions AICT seems to benefit to practitioners well-being shortly after training through increases in self-esteem and in the sense of connectedness. Prolonged AICT practice is associated with added decreased trait anxiety and increased positive affect. Further research is needed to confirm these findings with a sample including AICT-uninterested participants, and to clarify the underlying mechanisms of AICT.

The increasing deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) assistive systems across healthcare, education, and organisational domains necessitates a deeper understanding of dispositional factors shaping trust and acceptance. This study investigated the Big Five personality traits as predictors of trust in and acceptance of AI assistive systems among a large adult sample (N = 380) in Makurdi Benue State. Anchored in the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) developed by Davis (1989), the study examined both direct and indirect pathways linking personality traits to AI acceptance through trust. Participants completed standardised measures of the Big Five Inventory, Trust in AI Scale, and AI Acceptance Scale. Data were analysed using structural equation modelling (SEM) with maximum likelihood estimation. The hypothesised model demonstrated good fit indices (CFI = .84, TLI = .82, RMSEA = .05). Openness to experience ({beta} = .34, p < .001) and agreeableness ({beta} = .27, p < .01) significantly predicted trust in AI systems, which in turn strongly predicted AI acceptance ({beta} = .62, p < .001). Neuroticism negatively predicted trust ({beta} = -.29, p < .001), while conscientiousness showed a modest positive direct effect on acceptance ({beta} = .18, p < .05). Extraversion was not a significant direct predictor but exerted an indirect effect through trust. Mediation analysis confirmed that trust significantly mediated the relationship between personality traits and AI acceptance. The findings underscore the centrality of dispositional traits in shaping technological trust formation and highlight the psychological architecture underlying human AI interaction. These results contribute to social psychological theory and provide empirical guidance for designing personality sensitive AI systems to enhance user adoption and sustained engagement.

During sideways movement of an observer, optic flow parsing - in which an objects speed in the world is extracted from all the other visual movement present in the scene, self-generated and otherwise - has been shown to be incomplete, leading to biases in speed perception, particularly when object and observer are moving in opposite directions. Here, we assess how judgements about the speed of objects moving in depth (judged relative to the world) towards or away from an observer (6 m/s) are affected by simultaneous movement of the observer either in the same or opposite direction as the object. In a virtual reality display, participants (n = 25) viewed a sphere simulated as moving in a corridor either while they were stationary or during visually simulated self-motion in the same or opposite direction as the object. They judged the spheres movement relative to the world by comparing its motion to a probe sphere that travelled laterally across the corridor in front of them. In a second experiment (n = 28) participants performed the same task but during faster self-motion (10 m/s). The second cohort also judged the direction in which the object was perceived to move during the same combinations of self and object speeds. Object speed was overestimated when the object travelled in the direction opposite to the observer compared to how objects motion was judged when the observer was stationary. However, object speed was also overestimated during self-motion in the same direction as the object where participants were also much more likely to misjudge the direction of motion of the object. Precision of judgements was lower when self-motion was simulated than it was for stationary observers. A simple arithmetic model of flow parsing fails to capture these results satisfactorily, suggesting that different mechanisms may be at play when the observer travels in the same direction as a moving object and is vulnerable to misperceiving its direction of travel.

Nonduality is a foundational but conceptually elusive notion across several contemplative traditions. Nondual traditions challenge the assumption that a subject-object structure characteristic of ordinary experience is an intrinsic feature of conscious awareness. However, little remains known about the neurocognitive mechanisms associated with such experiential state. Here, we investigated how Open Presence (OP) meditation, a form of non-dual mindfulness practice, modulates bodily self-representation and large-scale brain functional organization. We combined the Full-Body Illusion Experience (FBIE), a virtual reality paradigm manipulating bodily self-processing, with resting-state functional connectivity gradient analyses in expert meditators (>10,000 hours of practice) and meditation novices. We hypothesized that OP would attenuate bodily self susceptibility as measured by FBIE and increase large-scale integration of functional brain networks, consistent with prior findings linking reduced self-boundaries and ego-dissolution to increased connectome integration. Seventy-five participants (28 experts, 47 novices) underwent fMRI scanning during OP meditation. Brain network organization was assessed using connectivity gradients and network dispersion/ eccentricity metrics. Group differences were evaluated using bootstrap statistics and support vector classification. Compared with novices, expert practitioners showed reduced global network eccentricity during OP, particularly within dorsal attention, ventral attention, and frontoparietal networks, suggesting greater large-scale integration of functional networks. These neural patterns were positively correlated with FBIE self-report measures and negatively with cognitive defusion scores, a construct thought to reflect reduced self-grasping toward thoughts and mental contents. Together, these findings suggest that nondual meditation is associated with alterations in self-representation and increased large-scale functional integration, providing candidate neural markers of nondual awareness.

Current debates regarding the relative contribution of saliency versus semantics to gaze control often rely on comparing the predictive power of saliency and meaning maps. We argue that such indirect, global approaches are fundamentally limited because fixations arise from heterogeneous, local causes that are conflated in whole-scene comparisons. To substantiate this claim, we used a direct method where participants explicitly identified the reasons for fixation at specific clusters of high fixation density, distinguishing between low-level saliency and various semantic categories, as well as the most important one. The obtained judgments revealed that multiple factors contribute simultaneously to gaze control. Although their influence varied across fixation clusters, semantics generally dominated saliency. Notably, abstract semantic categories, particularly "unknown/unusual," proved important, highlighting the role of prior knowledge and novelty besides personal relevance in guiding attention. To interpret these findings in the context of existing models, we propose a framework distinguishing between processes highlighting interesting locations in the image from a sampling strategy translating this information into scanpaths. Within this framework, classic saliency and meaning maps are viewed as restricted inputs to the strategy, whereas deep learning-based models (e.g., DeepGaze IIE) are more general and may also implicitly encode aspects of the strategy itself. Consistent with this, we found that the predictive performance of DeepGaze IIE varied less significantly with the specific reasons for fixation than that of classic saliency and meaning map approaches.

Humans make emotional facial expressions and have a cardiac response when they catch themselves in a mistake or receive feedback about task performance. We tested whether rats exhibit similar visceral responses in the context of metacognition. We assessed heart rate variability (HRV) and machine learning-detected facial expressions as female and male rats detected and stopped in-progress mistakes and received post-choice rewards or error cues. HRV increased during internally detected mistakes, as well as in response to external error cues for both sexes. Errors were associated with an HRV response when parasympathetic tone was higher, while rewards were associated with an HRV response when sympathetic tone was higher. We observed sex-specific effects of cardiac interoception on cognitive control over real-time action correction, in that low parasympathetic tone was associated with reduced ability to stop in-progress mistakes exclusively in females. Rats made facial expressions during mistake detection and in response to task feedback. Outcome-related facial expressions were valence-specific, in that the facial expression after error feedback was delayed relative to the post-reward facial expression. Our results suggest that rats have a visceral experience during metacognitive monitoring.

Intense aesthetic experiences are among the most complex responses arising from the interaction of mind, brain, and context. Observations from fMRI suggest that when viewers feel highly moved by artworks, the underlying neural states differ from those accompanying less intense responses, particularly through recruitment of the DMN. Using electroencephalography and Bayesian category-specific cumulative link mixed models, we investigated whether such putative peak aesthetic responses exhibit threshold-specific neurodynamics rather than linear scaling with intensity. Twenty-two Chilean participants viewed 113 diverse local artworks whilst rating how moved they felt on a four-point scale. We analysed both canonical oscillatory power ({theta}-{gamma}) and aperiodic components (offset and exponent) during the contemplation window and the post-elicitor window. Threshold-specific effects were found: spectral features differentiated the highest rating category from moderate responses, rather than scaling uniformly across all intensity levels. During artwork visualisation, power in the {beta}1 and {beta}2 bands, as well as the interaction of {beta}1 with the 1/f exponent, predicted the transition to the most intense response; during the post-elicitor window, the aperiodic 1/f exponent predicted the transition from very low to higher-intensity responses. Modelling individual differences in spectral signatures (in the and {gamma} bands) credibly improved predictive performance (approximate leave-one-out cross-validation; elpd_loo), suggesting that neural variability reflects meaningful mechanistic heterogeneity in aesthetic processing rather than mere noise. These findings speak to a broader question, how the brain marks the intensity of conscious experience, and, more specifically, support the hypothesis that being intensely moved constitutes a qualitatively distinct neural state, characterised by specific configurations of oscillatory dynamics and cortical excitability that modulate the transition from low and moderate to peak engagement.

Attentional control balances proactive suppression of predictable distractors with reactive suppression of unexpected ones. Yet, how internal states such as alertness shape this balance is unclear. Using pupillometry and eye tracking across two probability-cueing experiments (conducted in 2024) with varying distractor prevalence, we distinguished tonic (baseline pupil size across blocks) from trial-level pupil size fluctuations (trial-by-trial residual variability in pre-stimulus pupil size). With moderate prevalence, suppression of frequent-region distractors developed gradually, whereas high prevalence induced near-immediate suppression. Behavioral measures (e.g., reaction times) were closely linked to tonic and trial-level pupil size fluctuations. Critically, both alertness components jointly influenced control: during early learning, heightened trial-level pupil size increased distractor capture and reduced target fixations, whereas later on, suppression shifted to a proactive mode resilient to trial-level fluctuations. Under high prevalence, this shift occurred faster. Notably, higher trial-level pupil size generally accelerated first target selection. These findings show that tonic alertness and trial-level alertness fluctuations dynamically regulate reactive and proactive control during statistical learning. Impact StatementThis study shows that people become better at ignoring predictable distractions over time, but that this improvement depends not only on what they have learned about the task environment, but also on their current level of alertness. By combining eye tracking and pupil measures, we found that temporary increases in alertness can sometimes help people orient more quickly to relevant information, yet during earlier stages of learning they can also make attention more vulnerable to distracting events. These findings suggest that successful focus in complex environments depends on a dynamic interplay between learned expectations and moment-to-moment fluctuations in mental state, with implications for understanding sustained attention in settings such as monitoring, driving, and other tasks that require people to stay engaged while resisting distraction.

Numerosity adaptation (the underestimation of number after exposure to a numerous adaptor) is reduced when adaptor and test differ in color, suggesting that the numerosity system parses items into color-defined categories. Here we ask whether this chromatic selectivity is organized into multiple narrowly tuned chromatic channels, and whether its expression depends on individual chromatic sensitivity. Twenty observers (aged 22-61) completed two psychophysical tasks. First, chromatic discrimination was measured for five hues spaced in 5{degrees} CIE L*a*b* steps ({Delta}H = 0{degrees}, 5{degrees}, 10{degrees}, 15{degrees}, 20{degrees}) from a red reference (LCh: 54, 118, 38), yielding an individual just-noticeable difference (JND). Second, numerosity adaptation was measured across the same five chromatic distances between a 48-dot adaptor and the test. Observers with superior discrimination (JND < 2.5{degrees}) showed robust chromatic tuning, adaptation declining as the test moved away from the adaptor hue, whereas poorer discriminators showed none. Using an interindividual-covariance / factor-analytic approach, we found that adaptation strengths at neighboring chromatic distances were highly correlated and fell off with chromatic separation. Principal component analysis extracted two factors, one loading on the larger chromatic distances and one on the smaller; under oblique (promax) rotation the two factors were substantially correlated (r = .66), implying at least two dissociable but overlapping chromatically tuned mechanisms. These results suggest that numerosity adaptation is mediated by multiple, comparatively narrow chromatic channels, resembling the higher-order color mechanisms inferred from color scaling, SSVEP, and fMRI, rather than the two early cardinal axes (L-M, S-(L+M)).

Studying chess experts helps researchers understand how intensive practice shapes thinking skills. Cognitive flexibility is the ability to adjust thoughts when rules or tasks change. Working memory is the ability to hold and use information over short periods. This study compared cognitive flexibility and working memory precision between adolescent chess players and non-players. Twenty-four professional chess players and twenty-five controls completed two novel behavioral tasks. Chess players showed better accuracy in both tasks than controls. They adapted more efficiently when rules changed during a continuous learning task. They also remembered facial expressions more precisely in a working memory task. Learning rates in the flexibility task did not differ between groups. These results indicate that chess expertise may improve rule-guided flexibility and visual working memory precision in adolescents.

Humans rely on multiple sensory modalities, such as vision, audition, and touch, to perceive materials in everyday life. Previous research shows that multisensory perception leads to facilitation, yet the mechanisms responsible for this facilitation remain poorly understood. One potential mechanism is crossmodal prediction, whereby input from one modality generates predictions about another. While substantial research on multisensory facilitation has focused on bottom-up processes, such as spatial, temporal, and semantic congruency, the role of crossmodal predictions, particularly in material perception, has received little attention. To address this gap, we conducted two experiments, a reaction time task and a material rating task, in which participants viewed computer-generated animations of familiar objects being dropped to the ground. The paradigm exploited the natural temporal structure of impact events: pre-impact visual appearance provides information about an objects material and therefore can generate expectations about the forthcoming impact sound. Critically, participants saw the event only until before the impact, after which the video was masked. Thus, vision and audition were temporally aligned but not presented concurrently, allowing us to isolate the influence of visually driven expectations on the incoming auditory information without a bottom-up conflict. In some trials, the sound matched the expected material, but in a subset, it was incongruent, violating expectations elicited by the preceding visual information. Across both experiments, participants took longer to respond on incongruent than congruent trials, suggesting increased processing demands. In the rating task, incongruent trials also shifted material judgments, such that ratings reflected a weighted combination of incoming auditory information and visually driven predictions, with large individual differences in relative cue weighting. These findings suggest that priors on material properties from one modality, specifically vision, not only establish high-level expectations within the modality about an objects future state, but also extend across modalities.

In non-verbal communication, observers infer emotions from visible facial movements, yet emotional experiences are described in internal bodily terms (e.g., "my heart skipped a beat"). This contrast highlights a tension between external sensory cues and internal signals. In this context, we examined an overlooked gap in affective science: what makes an emotional portrayal believable, and do believability judgments reflect only what observers can see or also the portraying person's internal cardiac dynamics? To test this, we created 311 scenario-driven acting clips designed to avoid prototypical posed displays. For each clip, we quantified facial movement magnitude from the video, recorded ECG during preparation and enactment, and collected actors' self-reports. Online participants (N = 371) viewed these clips and provided emotion recognition responses and continuous ratings of believability, valence, or arousal. The results show that believability decreased as movement magnitude increased, with a non-linear relationship indicating a stronger penalty as motion increased. Valence further shaped this pattern, with increasing movement reducing believability more strongly for portrayals with negative valence. This effect persisted after accounting for intended emotion, perceived arousal, and emotion recognizability. Cardiac dynamics varied during performance, and actors' higher heart rate variability was associated with higher believability for positively valenced portrayals. Together, these findings show that believability is driven by visible movement cues interpreted in relation to valence, with actors' cardiac dynamics showing selective alignment with believability. These results identify core components of believable emotional expressions and provide a basis for studying such judgments in everyday social interaction.

Eye contact is one of the most potent social signals, but it remains unclear how little visual input is sufficient to register direct gaze, and whether such registration requires conscious awareness. Here, we used a custom tachistoscope to present faces for only 1-5 ms, asking whether gaze direction can shape perception at the very limits of vision. Direct-gaze faces required less visual input to localise than averted-gaze faces and produced higher localisation sensitivity from 3 ms onwards. Crucially, this advantage emerged before participants could explicitly categorise gaze direction, and before perceptual awareness ratings showed metacognitive access to the information driving localisation, both of which appeared only at 4-5 ms. Information-theoretic analyses confirmed that localisation responses carried stimulus-location information before explicit reports and awareness ratings became informative. A second experiment showed that the earliest eye-contact advantage depended mainly on low spatial frequencies, indicating a role for coarse visual information. Finally, autistic traits were associated with a reduced localisation advantage for direct gaze. These findings show that eye contact can influence perceptual processing within just a few milliseconds, with less visual stimulation than is required for conscious access to gaze direction.

Empathy enables individuals to attune to others' experiences through shared affective, sensorimotor, and neural representations, but its influence on higher-level decision-making and social alignment remains unknown. We examined whether empathy promotes social conformity and whether this effect depends on physiological arousal, visual attention, and socio-emotional traits. Seventy-three participants completed an empathy-for-pain task followed by a modified random-dot task in which they interacted with previously seen empathy targets, while physiological signals and eye movements were recorded. Drift-diffusion modeling showed that feedback from empathy targets increased conformity, reflected in stronger decision bias toward targets, faster evidence accumulation, and reduced decision conservatism. Visual attention to the eyes or mouth was linked to greater conformity depending on the context. Heart rate variability was unrelated to conformity, whereas phasic skin conductance was associated with smaller bias changes and greater conservatism. Alexithymia and autistic traits further shaped the empathy-conformity relationships. These findings suggest that empathic shared representation extends beyond affective resonance to influence social alignment in decision-making.

Many forms of memory are thought to rely on visual imagery, but individuals who report lacking visual imagery (aphantasia) can still perform various memory tasks. There is, however, evidence that aphantasia may lead to less detailed autobiographical memories, suggesting there may be deficits in the underlying cognitive processes that support personal memories. One such process is associative memory, which requires binding of different types of information. Here, we tested whether associative visual memory is intact in aphantasia. We assessed 72 self-identified individuals with aphantasia and 77 controls who reported having visual imagery. Participants completed an associative memory task which involved memorising displays where a unique object in a specific location was associated with a particular colour fixation point. Individuals with aphantasia performed equivalently to controls for object locations and outperformed controls on the associated object-identity. In addition, whereas controls were significantly worse at remembering associated object-identity than object-location, individuals with aphantasia showed no such difference. Both groups showed good metacognitive performance evidenced by a positive correlation between confidence and accuracy; there were no significant differences in confidence between the groups. Reported strategies varied between groups: a large proportion of control participants reported using visual imagery and self-reported use of imagery positively correlated with performance. Conversely, individuals with aphantasia mostly reported using nonvisual strategies to remember the associations. Overall, the findings suggest that individuals with aphantasia can form associative memories using nonvisual strategies. Thus, difficulties with autobiographical memory in aphantasia seem unlikely to be due to fundamental issues with associative memory.

Visual search is a critical component of many professions such as military operations, baggage screening, and radiology. Aided Target Recognition (AiTR) systems are designed to highlight potential threats across the operator visual field in real-time, directing attention and improving accuracy. However, these systems may impact search and, consequently, situational awareness by diverting attentional resources from non-highlighted, yet relevant, locations. Previous work suggests that scene gist is extracted within the first 250 ms of scene onset (Vo & Henderson, 2010). As such, this study examined whether a 250 ms AiTR onset delay could encourage a more even distribution of attention. Participants searched synthetically generated scenes and classified each person in the scene as armed or unarmed. Depending on their condition, participants either saw the scenes unaugmented (No AiTR condition), with AiTR highlights consisting of red bounding boxes around armed people and yellow boxes around unarmed (AiTR condition), or with AiTR highlights presented 250 ms post scene onset (Delayed AiTR condition). A surprise memory test of background objects presented in the search scenes was administered to all participants upon completion of the search task. As predicted and preregistered, results showed less overt attentional deployment to background information (anything other than the people themselves) in the AiTR condition compared to No AiTR , however, decreased overt attentional deployment was not seen in the Delayed AiTR group. A similar pattern was observed in the memory data (with the AiTR condition having a lower score than the No AiTR condition and the Delayed AiTR condition), this difference was not significant.

Social media users often feel that time vanishes while scrolling, but real feeds confound novelty, rewards, social signals, and self-paced control, leaving the driver of this distortion unclear. We tested whether self-paced visual exploration is sufficient to compress subjective time by comparing active scrolling with passive, yoked viewing and a static baseline. Twenty-three adults viewed sequences of natural images under three within-subject conditions: Scrolling (self-paced mouse clicks), Watching (a passive, yoked replay of their own scrolling sequence), and a Baseline (a static image). Participants estimated the elapsed duration of each block. Subjective duration was most compressed under Scrolling (48% of elapsed time), followed by Watching (51%) and Baseline (65%). Two sources separated these effects. Adding back the empty inter-image fixations brought the image-rich conditions to within seconds of the Baseline, showing that observers barely counted the blank gaps; the Scrolling--Watching difference, by contrast, was independent of these shared gaps, isolating self-paced control as a second source of compression. Electrophysiology linked that control to anticipatory neural states and the timing of early visual responses, with no amplified encoding of individual images. The results favor an attention-weighted account of timing, on which subjective duration tracks how much attention reaches the clock, a resource that a self-paced stream and its uncounted gaps both draw away.

Interception of moving objects requires the nervous system to compensate for sensory delays and uncertainty, yet how behavior is controlled remains debated. Key questions concern whether predictive processes play any role at all and, if so, whether they rely on simple motion extrapolation or incorporate internalized physical priors, such as gravity. Another open question is whether observers adopt a single control strategy or flexibly switch between predictive and reactive control - or between different predictive strategies - depending on task demands. To address these questions, we developed a virtual interception task in which participants intercepted moving targets under systematically varied conditions. We manipulated gravity (1g vs. 0g), visual availability (occluded vs. non-occluded), target velocity, and the initial spatial configuration of the ball and paddle (same vs. opposite side). Results indicate that interception is supported by predictive mechanisms across conditions. Behavioral patterns during occluded 0g trials suggest that participants extrapolate target motion using expectations consistent with gravity. Target velocity, visual occlusion, and task geometry modulated movement strategies, indicating that predictive control is flexibly adapted to task demands. These findings support the view that interception relies on predictive internal models incorporating structured physical priors while revealing flexible, context-dependent adaptations to sensory and task constraints.

Across contemplative traditions, deeper states of meditation are described as states of heightened clarity, vividness, and stillness of mind, yet what this clarity corresponds to in the brain has remained difficult to specify. The functional signal-to-noise ratio (f-SNR) framework frames mental clarity as a measurable property of neural signals: the degree to which brain activity tracks the causes of sensory signals rather than endogenous, irrelevant fluctuations. It predicts that deepening meditation should raise f-SNR, expressing sensory events more faithfully in neural signals against ongoing background activity. We tested this prediction across different levels of meditative depth. Twenty-nine experienced Vipassana practitioners meditated while auditory tones were presented, periodically reporting their depth of meditation. f-SNR was quantified from event-related potentials (ERPs) in a fronto-central P3 window and from single-trial decodability of auditory tone-evoked activity against no-tone background EEG. High-depth states were associated with greater ERP signal-to-noise ratio, stronger single-trial signal consistency, and improved decodability of auditory tones. These results suggest that meditative depth is expressed in the reproducibility and stimulus-background separability of sensory responses, consistent with deep meditation enhancing the brain's functional signal-to-noise ratio by improving the clarity of sensory signals and reducing endogenous noise.

Background Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder (EUPD) is characterised by emotional dysregulation, unstable self-identity, interpersonal difficulties, dissociation, and a high prevalence of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI). Mental imagery plays a role in emotion processing and autobiographical memory. Yet little is known about the relation between voluntary visual imagery and self-harm in EUPD. The study aimed to examine the imagery characteristics, including visual imagery vividness and synaesthetic-like experiences, and their association with NSSI in EUPD. Method Forty adults aged 18-45 years meeting ICD-10 Diagnostic Criteria for Research (ICD-10 DCR) for EUPD were recruited through purposive sampling. Visual imagery was assessed using the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire-2 (VVIQ-2). NSSI and its functions were assessed using the Inventory of Statements About Self-Injury (ISAS). Synaesthesia-like experiences were screened using a seven-item questionnaire developed for the study. Group comparisons were performed using independent-samples t-tests, and correlations were assessed using Pearson's correlation coefficient. Results Twenty-nine patients (72.5%) with EUPD had NSSI. Participants with NSSI had significantly higher mean VVIQ-2 scores than those without NSSI (118.48 +/- 24.81 vs. 93.36 +/- 35.66; p = 0.016; Cohen's d = 0.89). VVIQ-2 scores correlated positively with intrapersonal ISAS functions (r = 0.38, p = 0.015) but not interpersonal functions (r = 0.19, p = 0.22). Three participants (7.5%) demonstrated imagery scores compatible with probable hyperphantasia. Four participants reported synaesthesia-like experiences. Conclusions Greater visual imagery was associated with non-suicidal self-harm in patients with EUPD. Imagery vividness was predominantly associated with intrapersonal functions of non-suicidal self-harm, particularly affect regulation, rather than interpersonal motivations. These findings suggest that visual imagery may represent a previously under-recognized cognitive factor contributing to emotional dysregulation and self-injurious behaviour in EUPD. Assessment of imagery characteristics may have clinical relevance when designing psychotherapeutic interventions for EUPD.